Mercer Law Review
Volume 65
Number 2 Articles Edition

Article 6

3-2014

Brainerd Currie's Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking Back,
Looking Forward
Kermit Roosevelt III

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Roosevelt, Kermit III (2014) "Brainerd Currie's Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking Back, Looking
Forward," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 65: No. 2, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol65/iss2/6

This Address is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture

Brainerd Currie's Contribution to
Choice of Law: Looking Back,
Looking Forward
by Kermit Roosevelt III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this Article is Currie's contribution to choice of law.
There is a historical reason for that because Currie is an enormously
important figure in the field, and there is a value to understanding what
he said and what it meant.' And there is a more practical reason,
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Harvard University (A.B.,
1993); Yale Law School (J.D., 1997). Member, Yale Law Journal (1995-1997); Senior Editor
(1996-1997). Thanks to Dean Gary Simson for the invitation to present this lecture; to the
students, faculty, and practitioners who attended for their comments and attention; and
to the staff of the Mercer Law Review for their editorial assistance. Alisa Melekhina and
Yosha Gunasekera provided research assistance.
1. As a guide to Currie's thoughts and choice of law more generally, one cannot do
better than BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963), a book

that belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the field.

501

MERCER LAW REVIEW

502

[Vol. 65

because I will argue-or at least suggest-that this insight can answer
some questions that still seem unresolved. It can do that if it is properly
understood, which I think it generally is not. Currie himself, I will
suggest, didn't quite understand his insight, or at least the implications
of it.
The Article will thus start by recounting, very briefly, the story of
choice of law-or at least the standard version of it. It will discuss
Currie's place in that story and the nature of his deep insight. Spoiler
alert: That insight is, I will suggest, not about the correct outcome in
particular cases. It is not about outcomes at all. It is about the
structure of the choice-of-law problem. It is about the different steps
that a court must go through in answering a choice-of-law question-and
who has the power to give answers at those different steps.
After explaining what I think is the deep insight, and briefly
canvassing some objections, this Article will then try to demonstrate how
the insight solves some problems. First, it will examine some questions
that Currie got wrong, which he got wrong because he did not follow his
own insight to its logical conclusion. Second, it will discuss something
he got right, though he did not quite understand why. Third, the Article
will consider how Currie's insight applies to some recent United States
Supreme Court decisions. Most scholars do not think the Court has been
deciding choice-of-law cases recently-indeed, the Court itself seems not
to think so-but I will argue that some recent decisions are in fact about
choice of law, and that the Court has decided them consistently with
Currie's views. Last, the Article will discuss how following the insight
a step further might affect the current state of choice of law. Many
people think choice of law is a mess.' This Article will suggest that, to
the contrary, if we accept Currie's basic insight, the picture is not quite
so gloomy.
II.

THE STORY OF CHOICE OF LAW

I will start with the history of choice of law. Choice-of-law issues will
arise whenever there are interactions between different legal regimes,
or people governed by them, and so it is no surprise that choice of law

2. Indeed, I have said as much myself. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice
of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2449 (1999) ("Choice of law is a mess.
That much has become a truism."). But see Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess?
International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009) (arguing that
"these 'mess' claims do not accurately describe at least one domain of choice of law-international choice of law").
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is one of the oldest areas of legal thought. But, as far as this Article
is concerned, we can start with the early American approaches. We can
start with Joseph Story, whose Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws'
were an important early work, something like the nineteenth century's
version of a Restatement. Story's basic principle was comity-mutual
respect between sovereigns-but he expected comity to be implemented
primarily through territoriality.' If the courts of Georgia, for instance,
were hearing a case about a tort that occurred in Alabama, Story
believed they should show respect for the State of Alabama and its laws
by applying those laws to decide the case.
After Story came Joseph Beale, who took the idea of comity and gave
it a slightly harder metaphysical edge.' Beale relied on territoriality as
well, but he did not offer it as a nice way to respect the authority of
other states. He said it was mandatory.' It was part of the nature of
law.'

Law, says Beale, "[bly its very nature .

..

must apply to every-

thing and must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of
its jurisdiction."' So to decide what law governs a particular transaction, all you need to do is figure out where it happens. The law of that
place creates rights-it vests them in the appropriate parties, which is
why Beale's theory is often called the vested-rights approach.o And
those rights will be transitory-they can be taken to other places and
sued upon." So for Beale, when the Georgia court hears a case about
an Alabama tort, it has no choice. Alabama law is the only law that
creates rights related to that tort, and Georgia must recognize those
rights, unless it has some good reason not to.

3. Reportedly, a choice-of-law code was found in the wrappings of a crocodile mummy
dating from Ptolemaic Egypt. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private
InternationalLaw, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 300 (1953). What use the crocodile was intended
to make of the doctrine is unknown.
4. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC (1972).

5. The territorial principle, that the laws of a state have force within its borders and
not outside them, was for Story "[t]he first and most general maxim" of conflicts. Id. at 19.
6. For background information on Beale, see, for example, Perry Dane, Joseph Henry
Beale, Jr., in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 31-32 (Roger K.

Newman ed., 2009).
7.

1: JURISDICTION, JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws

§

4.12,

at 46 (1935).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness,"and Choice ofLaw, 96 YALE L.J. 1191,
1194-95 (1987).
11. See id.
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Now, this might sound like silly mumbo jumbo-rights magically
appear, and then you can carry them around with you in your suitcase.' 2 But before ridiculing it, I always like to point out that it is
largely the way we think about judgments. An individual who wins a
judgment under one state's law can effectively take it into another state
and demand that it be recognized-and, in fact, can make that demand
in the name of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution."

But having said that, Beale's theory still actually is silly mumbo
jumbo. Law is not by its nature territorial, at least not in any way that
states are bound to respect. (Back when people believed this, they also
thought that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitutionl4 imposed limits, basically territorial limits, on state legislative
jurisdiction." But the Supreme Court has foreclosed this interpretation.") Beale's theory works nicely, for the most part, if everyone
accepts its metaphysical premises and acts in accordance with them.
For a while they did. For instance, in the well-known case of Alabama
Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll," the Alabama Supreme Court,
discussing an Alabama tort statute, said that it must be read as if it
explicitly limited its scope to injuries received in Alabama." Why must
it be read that way? Because asserting the authority to attach legal
consequences to an injury occurring outside the state's borders would be
unprecedented and "astounding to the profession." 9
But once people stop believing this, and in particular once courts stop
applying the Constitution to enforce it, it does start to look silly. The
realization that it is silly is something we generally associate with the

12. Not just transitory rights, but the whole concept of rights, were mocked by the
"legal realists" who attacked Beale. In 1933, David Cavers wondered in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review, "how any juristic construct such as 'right' could have been accepted
as fundamental in the explanation of any important aspect of judicial activity." David F.
Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 175-76 (1933).
13. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) ("Regarding
judgments, however, the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in
one Isitate, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and
persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land."); see also
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
15. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588 (1897).
16. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981).
17. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1893).
18. Id. at 807.
19. Id.
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legal realists, in particular Walter Wheeler Cook.20 Cook, said Currie,
"discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one
man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another."" (One
aspect of Currie's greatness was certainly his writing style.)
It is silly because Beale's incredibly complicated system turns out to
be built upon nothing.22 Not nothing, exactly, but jurisprudential
assumptions that fell out of favor and that courts stopped enforcing. It
is a bit like Spinoza's ethics, and it's not surprising that it ended up
being rejected.
But rejecting Beale is one thing. What do you replace him with? The
realists did not have much of an answer-but Brainerd Currie did.
One reason, I have said, that territorialism looks silly is that it's a
tremendously complicated system built upon metaphysics that are not
true in any objectively verifiable sense. But it also produces results that
seem arbitrary in some cases. Carroll,the Alabama Supreme Court case
mentioned earlier, is a good example. In that case, Carroll, who worked
for the railroad, was injured when a link came loose as he was riding on
the train. Someone-a fellow employee-was negligent in inspecting the
link, and Carroll was injured because of that negligence.24
Under the common law, that would create a problem for Carroll if he
wanted to recover damages from his employer, which he did.2 5 At
common law, employers were not liable for injuries that one employee
caused to another, the so-called fellow-servant rule. 6 Luckily for
Carroll, Alabama had abrogated that rule by statute." Alabama law
provided that when an employee was injured by a fellow servant, the
employer was liable.2 ' But, unluckily for him, his injury occurred in

20. For Cook's critique, see generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
21. BRAINERD CURRIE, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 6.

22. The territorial principle, as I have described it, may sound deceptively simple. To
get a sense of the complexity of Beale's system, one should spend some time with the
REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) or Beale's three-volume, 2000-page

treatise commenting on it. See Beale, supra note 7.
23. See generally BARUCH SPINOZA, ETHICS (R.H.M. Elwes trans. 1883, Middle Tenn.
State Univ., photo. reprint 1997) (1677), availableat http://capone.mtsu.edu/rbombard/RB
/spinozalethica-Front.html.
24. Carroll, 11 So. at 803-04.
25. Id. at 803.

26. See generally Evelyn Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-ServantRelations and
Employer Liability Law, 25 YALE J. L.& HUMAN 205, 230-35 (2013) (discussing the fellowservant rule).
27. See Carroll, 11 So. at 805.
28. Id.
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Mississippi.2 9 The place of a tort, Joseph Beale's system prescribed, is
the place of injury, since injury is the last event necessary to make the
tort complete.30 This tort occurred in Mississippi, and so Mississippi
law governed.3 ' And since Mississippi had not abrogated the fellowservant rule, Carroll could not recover."
Carroll is a wonderful case for illustrating the perversity of the
traditional approach, because the injury is really the only contact that
Mississippi had with the case. Carroll was from Alabama, as was the
railroad, and he negotiated and executed his contract of employment
there. The railroad lines were 90%inside Alabama. The negligence that
caused the injury occurred, the evidence suggested, in Alabama.33 So
Mississippi had nothing but the injury, yet that was enough. And that
should seem perverse regardless of what drives your intuitions about a
sensible result.
It did seem perverse to many people, including some judges, and they
began using various techniques to reach results that seemed more
sensible." But this raised the obvious question: if we have some
unstated intuitions about what sensible results are, and if we feel
strongly enough about them that we're willing to use these techniques-what people called "escape devices"-to reach them, why not try
to unpack those intuitions explicitly and come up with a system that
addresses them? That is where Currie comes in."

29. Id. at 804.
30. Id. at 806.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 808.
33. Id. at 803-04, 807.
34. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance:DirectFiling and Choice ofLaw
in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 767 (2012) (discussing escape
devices).
35. It is also, I believe, the basic philosophy behind the much-maligned RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT]. The SECOND
RESTATEMENT has been subject to much criticism in the law reviews. See, e.g., Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 321-22 n.149 (1990) ("no
explanatory power"); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens ofEqual and TerritorialStates:The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249,253 (1992) ("mush");
Roosevelt, supranote 2, at 2466 (stating that the Second Restatement "synthesiz[ed] a wide
range of insights into an indigestible stew"); Gary J. Simson, Leave Bad EnoughAlone, 75
IND. L.J. 649, 649-51 (2000) (describing the Second Restatement rules as bearing a
'striking and rather frightful resemblance" to territoriality); Joseph William Singer, Real
Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 77 (1989) ("mystifies rather than clarifies"). But if we view
Section 6 of the SECOND RESTATEMENT together with the presumptive rules set out in later
sections, the overall message seems to contain three elements: (1) territoriality is
frequently sensible; (2) in some identifiable situations, notably allocation of loss between
co-domiciliaries, it is not; (3) there may be other cases in which territoriality is not sensible,
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If you push people about their intuitions, they tend to start talking
about what states would want, what they're trying to achieve with their
laws-or, put more simply, their policies. Currie said, let's give policy
center stage." Let's be honest about what we're doing and think about
choice of law in terms of state policies. This, he said, is a matter of
interpreting the laws at issue to determine whether applying them to a
set of facts would further their purposes." If applying a law would
further its purposes, then the state whose law we are considering is
interested.3 8 And this means that in any case involving two states,
there are three possibilities. One state is interested; both states are
interested; or neither state is interested. If one state is interested, the
case is what Currie called a "false conflict," 9 and the solution is to
apply that state's law.4 0 If both are interested, the case is a true
conflict, and it cannot be solved by courts." Unable to solve the
conflict, the court should simply apply forum law.42 (Currie modified
this view a bit later on, but the modifications are irrelevant to my points
here.)4 3 If neither state is interested, then we have a bit of a puzzle.4
But we still have to decide the case somehow, Currie believed, so again
a court should apply its own state's law.45 Forum law is the default
choice, the presumption.

and whether it is or is not should be determined and explained openly in terms of the
factors set forth in § 6 rather than the subterfuge of an escape device. As choice-of-law
principles go, these are not bad.
36. See Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and
Enlightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1961).
37. BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 177, 183-84 [hereinafter CURRIE, Methods and
Objectives].
38. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1989) (describing Currie's methodology).
39. Peter Kay Westen, False Conflicts, 55 CAL. L. REV. 74, 75-76 (1967) ("The phrase
'false conflicts' which Currie himself never used, has nonetheless been consistently
attributed to him by others.").
40. See CURRIE, Methods and Objectives, supra note 37, at 177, 183-84.
41. Id. at 184.
42. Id.
43. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963) (suggesting that courts may resolve some true conflicts by a "moderate and
restrained interpretation" of state policy).
44. Such a case is what Currie called "unprovided" for. See CURRIE, Survival ofActions:
Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supranote
1, at 128, 152 [hereinafter CURRIE, Survival of Actions].
45. Id. at 156.
46. See Kramer, supra note 38, at 1302-03.
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Carroll, if you look at it this way, presented a false conflict. First,
consider Alabama law. Alabama law is designed to allow some
employees to recover damages. Which employees? Presumably the ones
with whose welfare Alabama is primarily concerned, that is, Alabama
employees.
Carroll was an Alabama resident, so Alabama was
interested in allowing him to recover.
What about Mississippi? Mississippi wants to protect some employers
from liability. Which employers? Presumably the ones with whose
welfare Mississippi is primarily concerned, that is, Mississippi employers, or maybe those doing business there. But the railroad was not a
Mississippi employer, and it did not do a significant amount of business
in Mississippi. So, Currie would say, Mississippi was not interested.
The case presented a false conflict and obviously should have been
decided under Alabama law.
That probably seems like a better outcome. The false conflict is
generally considered the crowning glory of interest analysis, so this is
the approach at its most persuasive. Indeed, some people would say that
the treatment of false conflicts is Currie's great contribution."' I would
phrase it a little differently, as I will explain, but I do think that false
conflicts make interest analysis look good. True conflicts and unprovided-for cases are a bit more problematic, and I will say a bit about them
too, later. But I have said enough about Currie now to start considering
his insight and its criticisms.
III.

CURRIE'S INSIGHT AND HIS CRITICS

First, how should we characterize the analysis I've just demonstrated?
What is Currie's contribution here? Some people, I have noted, say it is
the discovery of the false conflict.' I disagree with that; I will suggest
it's a much deeper insight. Some people say it is the idea of promoting
state policies-advancing governmental interests." I agree with that,
or I could, depending on what is meant by it. Some people, I think, took
this idea very much the wrong way. They took Currie to be saying that
there were these things out there-government interests-and the task
of a court or an analyst was to figure out how to promote them,

47. See Lea Brilnayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics
of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REv. 1125, 1158 (2010) ("[Tihe concept of a false
conflict has been hailed as Currie's great contribution to choice of law.").
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Erin O'Hara O'Connor, How Modern Choice of Law Helped to Kill the
Private Attorney General, 64 MERCER L. REv. 1023, 1044 (2013) (stating that Currie
"powerfully argued that the goal of choice of law should be to facilitate state policies").
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regardless of what the government of that state said or wanted.o This
is the view that produces the idea some scholars suggested, that courts
should advance the interests of other states even though the other states
don't believe those interests exist-the idea that states can be mistaken
about their own interests. 5' That I do not believe.
A third way of describing Currie's insight, which you see most in the
work of Larry Kramer, is to say that Currie realized that choice-of-law
cases were not fundamentally different from other cases about the scope
of state laws.52 They were not esoteric procedural questions to be
decided before getting to the merits of a case (contrary to Erin O'Hara
O'Connor's view)." They were about the substance of state laws, and
they were to be resolved by the same tools as ordinary domestic
cases-that is, by ordinary statutory interpretation.
I think this is the right way to characterize Currie's insight-it's what
Currie himself said"-and in just a bit I will try to explain where I
think the insight leads. But I want to pause for a second here to
acknowledge some criticisms, because they're powerful, and I think in
some ways they're quite correct.
The main criticism, leveled most forcefully by Lea Brilmayer, was that
this process of identifying state interests was not statutory interpretation." It was instead a process of constructing state interests from a
set of assumptions that did not correspond to actual legislative
preferences or intent." In my discussion of the Carroll case, I suggested that the legislatures of Alabama and Mississippi were seeking to
benefit certain individuals or entities, and then that those individuals
or entities were state domiciliaries-Alabama workers or Mississippi
employers. Now, what makes us think that?

50. See id. at 1026.
51. See, e.g., Westen, supranote 39, at 85; see also Herma Hill Kay, Comments on Reich
v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 584, 589 n.31 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 38, at 1302 ("[The premise of interest analysis is that
multistate cases are not different from ordinary domestic cases. . . .").

53. See O'Connor, supra note 49, at 1026 ("[C]hoice of law is, or at least should be, a
preliminary procedural question to be decided in pretrial hearings.").
54. See Kramer, supra note 38, at 1302.
55. See CURRIE, Methods and Objectives, supra note 37, at 177, 183-84.
56. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REv. 392, 413 (1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Interest Analysis].
57. See, e.g., id.; Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A
Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives].
For defenses, see generally Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest
Analysis, reprinted in 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 32 (1989); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law:
Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits," 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681 (1988).
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It is plausible-it's a basic tenet of political and constitutional
theory-that legislatures look after the interests of those who have a
voice in the political process." Alabama workers can vote in Alabama
elections, and out-of-staters cannot, so we would expect the Alabama
legislature to promote the interests of Alabama workers. But it is an
assumption. And legislatures might care about other things, too. For
one thing, they might care about Mississippi workers. Or, more
significantly, they might care about predictability; they might care about
ease of application. Those systemic considerations might lead them to
prefer a different scope to their statute-they might even prefer a
territorial scope. But interest analysis does not generally consider this
possibility."
To some degree, the critics are right. This does not look like ordinary
statutory interpretation. And there is another, perhaps more persuasive,
way of identifying the difference. With ordinary interpretation, if you
have a marginal case, you look at the purposes of the statute and ask if
application would promote those purposes.o You might have a statute
that refers to pedestrians, for instance, and you want to know whether
it includes rollerbladers. So you would ask the question: Why does this
statute single out pedestrians, and are rollerbladers relevantly similar?
Perhaps it's about the speed at which they travel-then rollerbladers
look different, because they go faster. Perhaps it is about air pollution-rollerbladers look similar. Perhaps it is about something else
entirely. But, whatever it is, there is a reason, and that reason either
applies to rollerbladers or it doesn't.
Interest analysis in choice of law is different. There, you have people
who are really indistinguishable-a Mississippi employer and an

58. This principle is the basic insight of John Hart Ely's process theory, see JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), and likewise the famous footnote four of United
States v. CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[Plrejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). As that footnote
acknowledges, the idea is present in Supreme Court precedent as far back as McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428-29 (1819) (noting the problem of Maryland inflicting costs
on out-of-staters to benefit locals by taxing a federal instrumentality).
59. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to
ProfessorCurrie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends
in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 938 (1975).
60. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-50 (1991) (describing
statutory interpretation and the role of legislative purpose with respect to extraterritorial
application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (2012)). This
is not the only approach to statutory interpretation, but it is probably the most common.
Id.
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Alabama employer-except for their domicile. And to figure out whether
to treat them differently, we don't look at the specific law and ask about
its purposes; we just assume that laws are for the benefit of locals and
not out-of-staters. We do not, oddly, ask whether the lawmaker might
have been concerned about systemic values like predictability or ease of
application.
But there are things to be said in Currie's defense as well. First,
Currie put forth the selfish-state analysis as an assumption (and a
deliberately oversimplified one) to demonstrate how the theory
It was not supposed to be a guide to conducting interest
worked.
analysis in actual cases-though unfortunately it seems to have been
taken that way, especially by critics.
Second, and more importantly, even if it is true that this is not
ordinary statutory interpretation, it is still statutory interpretation. And
this is what I think Currie's deep insight is. It is statutory interpretation because there is nothing else it could be. We have a state statute.
We are trying to figure out to whom it grants rights, and in what
circumstances. There is nothing that it could be except a question of
interpreting the statute, because there is nothing but the statute that
has the power to answer that question. Currie's fundamental insight is
about power. The first step of a choice-of-law analysis is figuring out the
scope of the relevant laws-to whom they grant rights. That is a
question about the meaning of those laws. And a state, speaking through
its legislature in a statute, or its high court in a rule of common law, has
the last word on the meaning of its laws.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INSIGHT

So that is what I take Currie's insight to be. The first step in
resolving a choice-of-law problem is to determine the scope of the
relevant state laws-that is what allows you to classify the case as a
false conflict, a true conflict, or an unprovided-for case. And the scope
of state law is a matter of state law. No one else has the power to
determine it.
Why is this an important insight? First, it will tell us some things
about how certain kinds of cases should come out. Some of these things
Currie realized, and some he did not. I will start with the implications
he did not see.

61. See CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 77, 89 [hereinafter Currie, Married Women's Contracts].
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First, Currie recommended a presumption of forum law.62 If there
was no sufficient reason to depart from the law of the forum, Currie
believed that courts should apply it." That makes some sense if you
are thinking about choice of law as a threshold procedural issue. But it
makes no sense if you think about it (as Currie thought we should) as
an issue about the scope of state laws. We do not start out a process of
interpretation by assuming that a statute reaches every case. That
makes no sense at all."
Second, Currie's analysis of the unprovided-for case concluded with a
similar prescription of forum law.65 And again, this makes some sense
if you suppose that choice of law is a threshold procedural issue that
must be decided before a court can go on to the merits. The case must
be decided under some law, you might think, and if there is no good
reason to use some other state's law, we will stick with our presumption
of forum law. 66
But I've already said that the presumption of forum law is a mistake,
and this resolution of the unprovided-for case is mistaken for the same
reason." Choice of law is not procedural; it is about the merits. And
when you find that a case is unprovided-for, you have found that neither
state's law grants rights related to this transaction. Neither state gives
the plaintiff a right to recover. And in that case, there is no need to
turn to forum law. The plaintiff has simply failed to state a claim. In
fact, you cannot turn to forum law. We have just said, remember, that
the laws at issue do not reach the case. That is what it means to call a
case unprovided-for. To then decide the case under forum law is to give
that law a scope we have just said it does not have, which is in violation
of the basic insight that the scope of state law is a question of the
meaning of state law. (This is a point I will claim the Supreme Court
has recognized.)
Those are two consequences, which Currie did not see, that follow from
his insight. Now I am going to turn to some that he did see, though not
always perfectly.

62.

Kramer, supra note 38, at 1302.

63.

Id. at 1302-03.

64. For elaboration of this point, see generally Kramer, supra note 38.
65. See CURRIE, Survival ofActions, supra note 44, at 128, 156.
66. Indeed, this is essentially Currie's position. See CURRIE, Survival ofActions, supra
note 44, at 156 (stating that "this is the rational and convenient way to try a lawsuit when
no good purpose is to be served by putting the parties to the expense and the court to the
trouble of ascertaining the foreign law").
67. For elaboration of this point, see generally Larry Kramer, The Myth of the
'Unprovided-for" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
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First, the easy one, the resolution of false conflicts. What is a false
conflict according to my description? It is a case where the events fall
within the scope of only one law. Only one law attaches legal consequences. Obviously, then, the case must be decided under that law. To
do otherwise is actually unconstitutional. (And this is also something
that the Supreme Court sometimes does recognize. This, in fact, is one
way of describing the famous case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,"
the Supreme Court recognized that only Pennyslvania law reached the
events in that case, and that therefore the case must be decided under
Pennsylvania law.)69

Second, a little more complicated, the true conflict. What Currie said
here was that true conflicts could not be resolved by courts."o And I
think this is close to right. What he saw was that this question cannot
be answered decisively by any one state. So it is another insight about
power. And it is an insight about the difference between the two steps
in the choice-of-law process. First, said Currie, we need to figure out if
there is a conflict." This first step is a matter of determining the scope
of the relevant state laws.72 And that is a question within the sole
power of each state to answer and to answer in a way that's binding on
everyone else.
Sometimes, this first-step analysis is all we need. If we find a false
conflict, I've said, we know we must apply the law of the only interested
state, as Currie said. If we find an unprovided-for case, we know the
plaintiff simply loses, which is not what Currie said, but it is the
consequence of his theory. But what if there is a true conflict? This is
not a question about the meaning of either state's law. It's a conflict
between the laws of two co-equal sovereigns. Each, presumably, can
determine the outcome in its own courts, subject to some constitutional
limitations that I am not going to discuss here." But neither can bind
the other. So the second insight is that at this second step, no one is
authoritative.7 ' Each state is free to decide for itself which law should
get priority.75 So too, I have argued elsewhere, is a federal court.7 1

68. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69. Id. at 80.
70. James R. Ratner, Using Currie'sInterestAnalysisto Resolve Conflicts Between State
Regulation and the Sherman Act, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 705, 732 (1989).
71. See id. at 729.
72. Id.
73. For an attempt to work out some of the limitations, see Roosevelt, supra note 2, at
2518-33.
74. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon
to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012).
75. Id.
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And the last issue that this insight resolves, which Currie did see,
though his conclusions were tentative: renvoi." Renvoi is one of the
classic puzzles of choice of law, and probably one of the things that
makes people think choice of law is so strange and esoteric. It is the
puzzle that arises when one state decides that another state's law
applies.7 ' A Georgia court, let us say, decides that a case should be
governed by Alabama law. Since Alabama choice-of-law rules are part
of Alabama law, the Georgia court starts its application of Alabama law
by looking to them. But it might be that Alabama choice-of-law rules
tell us the case should be governed by Georgia law.
But Currie's basic insight resolves this problem very neatly.79 When
does the renvoi problem arise? It arises when two states disagree about
whose law applies to some case. Each state thinks its own law does not
apply, and the other state's does. But remember the point about power:
each state is authoritative as to the scope of its own law. So each state
here thinks its law does not apply. And that is correct-it has to be,
because each state has the exclusive power to set the scope of its own
law. Each state also thinks the other state's law does apply, but on that
point they are both wrong. They are wrong because they cannot-they
lack the power to-contradict another state about the scope of its law.
The conclusion we reach when we look at this situation, keeping in mind
who has the power to answer the two different questions involved in
choice of law, is simply that neither state's law applies. The renvoi is
actually an unprovided-for case, which means, as argued above, that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
V.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Those are what I think are some consequences of Currie's insight.

They are not insignificant. They show us the right answer to some
cases, and they resolve one of the big, longstanding, theoretical puzzles
of choice of law. And everyone agrees, Currie was an enormously
important figure in choice of law. All the same, if you look at the current
legal landscape, you might not think that Currie is doing that well.
Only a few states follow classic interest analysis. The big winner is the
Second Restatement.'

Now, it is true of course that the Second

76. Id.
77. See CURRIE, Methods and Objectives, supra note 37, at 177, 184.
78. Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by
Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1872 (2005).
79. For further elaboration of this argument, see generally id.
80. See Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: 26th
Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217,278-79 (2013) (tabulating choice-of-law approaches
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Restatement incorporates some of Currie's insights, but it is not, I think,
faithful to the deep insight, because it doesn't set up the analysis as a
two-step process. It has almost nothing about determining the scope of
state laws; it seems to assume that all state laws have the maximum
scope that is constitutionally permissible, and then it tries to resolve
conflicts via the most significant relationship test. And then there are
the territorialist holdouts. They do have a lot to say about scope-they
say that all state laws are territorial in scope-but they don't have much
to say about resolving conflicts-which is fair enough, or at least
understandable, because in the territorialist system, conflicts do not
arise. (Or so territorialists think.)"'
To put it briefly, states have adopted different approaches.8 2 This
strikes people as problematic, primarily because it produces "disuniformity." For the same case, you can file in Georgia and get one answer as
to which law applies or file in Alabama and get a different answer. For
a while it looked as though modern approaches might replace territorialism entirely, but no convergence appears likely in the foreseeable future.
So choice of law is a mess, and Currie's true insight is being neglected.
But now for the good news. There might not be a lot of courts that
have followed Currie's insight, but there's one that has: the United
States Supreme Court. You might not have heard that. It didn't make
headlines. But the Supreme Court has been using Currie's approach.
That should surprise you, but it's true. The Supreme Court has had
several cases recently about the extraterritorial application of American
law. It has rendered some terrible decisions in some of them-Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California,3 for example-but most recently it
has been completely in the Currie camp. Does a federal statute create
a cause of action when some relevant events happen outside the United
States? That is a choice-of-law question, of course; it is a question about
the scope of some sovereign's law in the multijurisdictional context, the
first question in any choice-of-law case. The Supreme Court does not
recognize this; it does not characterize the extraterritoriality cases as
choice-of-law cases.84 But how does it characterize them? It says that

in each state); see also SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 35.
81. See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2468.
82. See Symeonides, supra note 80.
83. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). For commentary on HartfordFire, see generally Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisdictionto Prescribe:Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42
(1995); Phillip R. Trimble, Editorial Comment, The Supreme Court and InternationalLaw:
The Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995).
84. See Kermit Roosevelt IlI, Guantanamoand the Conflict ofLaws: Rasul andBeyond,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2040 (2005).
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this is a question of statutory interpretation.85 It's up to Congress, and
we are just interpreting the law Congress wrote." That is Currie's
fundamental insight right there.
And, in fact, the Court is more Currie than Currie himself. What
happens if it decides that United States' law does not create a cause of
action? Foreign law doesn't either, let's suppose, or at least the parties
haven't invoked it. So we have an unprovided-for case. What do we do
with it? Currie, recall, said that such cases should be decided under
forum law, as that was the most convenient option." But this example
should make clear how wrongheaded that suggestion is-if we have just
decided that the case does not fall within the scope of federal law, we
cannot then say, "but let's decide it under federal law anyway, because
that's convenient." Lower courts, and the Supreme Court in earlier
cases, would dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which
reflects much the same idea: we can only decide cases under federal law,
but federal law doesn't apply, so we can't decide the case." But in its
most recent extraterritoriality case, Morrison v. NationalAustraliaBank
Ltd.," the Court said no-in an unprovided-for case the plaintiff has no
claim."o The plaintiff loses, just as I've argued he or she should in the
unprovided-for case. This is not a preliminary-jurisdictional issue; this
is about the merits.
Now, anyone familiar with Morrison (or the effective replay of
Morrison in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.9 ) might be skeptical
of the suggestion that these cases are a vindication of Brainerd Currie.
In each of them, the Court says that the federal law at issue is
territorial in scope." And territorialism, it is commonly supposed, is
anathema to interest analysis. Such cases, Larry Kramer has suggested,
are not the acceptance of Currie's insight; they're the return of Joseph
Beale."

85. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
86. See, e.g., id. ("Whether Congress has [legislated extraterritorially] is a matter of
statutory construction.").
87. See CURRIE, Survival of Actions, supra note 44, at 128, 156.
88. See, e.g., ArabianAm. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 247.
89. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
90. Id. at 2877 ("[To ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question.").
91. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (applying presumption against extraterritoriality to Alien
Tort Statute; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
92. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
93. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges ofBeale: ExtraterritorialApplicationofAmerican Law,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179 (1991).
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But this overstates the matter. Territorialism is just a particular
choice as to the geographical reach of a statute; it is what I have called
a rule of scope.94 The legislature is entitled to set the scope however
it wants, as the court in Morrison recognized.95 And if it does not make
that decision explicitly, the Court will make it-because it has to-as
part of the process of statutory interpretation. Now, one might say that
territorialism is not a sensible rule of scope. But that is not Currie's
insight. Currie's insight is that scope is a question within the power of
the legislature.
It can be territorialist if it wants, and if it doesn't
give any explicit direction, a court might decide that territorialism is the
best interpretation of its silence.
Currie did not seem to think it was.97 But his selfish-state example,
remember, was just an example. And he does seem to have systematically discounted what we could call systemic values like simplicity,
predictability, and ease of application. A court that valued those highly
might think that territorialism was the best option, particularly if it
seemed likely to get the majority of cases right anyway."
If we view its recent extraterritoriality cases sympathetically, the
Court is simply saying that in the absence of any indication that
Congress considered the question of extraterritoriality and made some
specific decision, the Court will prioritize systemic factors in interpreting
federal statutes." It could instead use the selfish-state assumption and
try to maximize a narrow understanding of American interests, but
concerns about foreign relations and international friction are plausible
reasons to hesitate. Congress is certainly more competent to assess
diplomatic considerations, and separation-of-powers concerns support a
moderate and restrained interpretation. All of this is entirely consistent
with Currie's insight.

94. See Roosevelt, supra note 74, at 18.
95. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
96. See Herma Hill Kay, "The Entrails of a Goat": Reflections on Reading Lea
Brilmayer's Hague Lectures, 48 MERCER L. REv. 891, 905 (1997).
97. Currie was frequently harshly critical of territorialism. See, e.g., CURRIE, Married
Women's Contracts, supra note 61.
98. Like legal education generally, conflict-of-laws classes tend to focus on the hard
cases, which may be anomalous. It is true that territorialism can produce strange results-Carrollis a good example-but it is also important to ask how frequently it will do
so, and the answer may be that it handles the vast majority of cases satisfactorily. New
approaches that promise to get the "right answer" in every case tend to demand so much
of lawyers and judges that one suspects they will yield a considerable number of errors in
practice. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Plotting the Next "Revolution" in Choice of Law: A
Proposed Approach, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, 281 (1991) (expressing skepticism about
workability of complicated approaches).
99. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665-69.

518

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

VI. THE ROAD AHEAD
So the first bit of good news is that the Supreme Court has adopted
Currie's view. But that is on the international stage; it does not affect
state practice. There we still have this troubling disuniformity of
approach. But the second bit of good news is that Currie's insight is
helpful here, too. Disuniformity of approach is not so troubling-it need
not produce as much disuniformity of result as people think-if we keep
Currie's insight in mind.
First, though, let me make a point about what we should not do. One
of the recent bits of activity in the choice-of-law field has been the
Economically minded scholars have
entrance of the economists.
suggested new directions for choice of law."o' Essentially, they have
suggested that choice of law should stop focusing on sovereign interests
and try to maximize efficiency.o1 We should do this, it seems, regardless of what state legislatures want. This is directly contrary to Currie's
insight. States have the power to set the scope of their laws. Economists do not, not even if they are really smart and know what is
efficient.102 This is a terrible, indeed unconstitutional, idea, a classic
example of economic imperialism (the tendency of economic analysis to
impose itself on other fields without any care for their own inner
structures).
So Currie's insight tells us that prioritizing efficiency is a bad idea.
It also tells us, if we think about it for a moment, that the current state
of affairs is not so bad, and that is my main point. Disuniformity in
choice-of-law approaches is not as bad as we think.
What, after all, does this disuniformity amount to? Georgia uses
territoriality, for instance, while Alabama uses (let's suppose) a selfishstate version of interest analysis. What are they disagreeing about?

100. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883
(2002); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000).
101. See Guzman, supranote 100, at 884; O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 100, at 1152.

102. A test of this theory came with the 2001 revision of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). Following the lead of efficiency-minded law professors, the American Law Institute
revised the UCC choice-of-law provision to allow parties, with some narrow exceptions, to
choose whatever law they wanted to govern their contracts. See U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2001).
This doubtless increased efficiency, but it did so at the expense of various state policies
intended to restrict liberty of contract. When it came time for states to adopt the new
version, every state rejected the choice-of-law section, preferring to stay with the older
one-less efficient, perhaps, but more protective of state interests. See HERMA HILL KAY,
LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS--QUESTIONS

100-101 (9th ed. 2013).
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Why do we get disuniformity of result? We get it because they are
disagreeing about the scope of state laws. Georgia is saying that
Georgia law is territorial-and so is the law of every other state.
Alabama is saying that Alabama law reaches any case in which it might
benefit a local-and so does every other state's law.
But this state of affairs should bring to mind our earlier discussion of
renvoi. There, too, we had states disagreeing about the scope of state
laws. That disagreement turned out not to be troubling, because we
know that each state is authoritative about the scope of its own law and
not about the scope of any other state's law. The same point holds here.
Georgia may say that Georgia law is territorial. It may not say that
about Alabama law or the law of any other state. Alabama may say that
its law extends as the selfish-state assumption dictates. It may not say
that about Georgia law or the law of any other state.
What does this mean? If we incorporate Currie's insight, we get a
situation in which all states will agree about the scope of state laws,
because each law has one authoritative interpreter. States will still
follow different approaches to choice of law, but all that will mean is
that they have chosen different scopes for their own laws. That is not
a problem. In fact, the adoption of different choice-of-law approaches is
really a boon to the analyst. The main problem pointed out by the
critics of interest analysis, recall, was that it was hard to figure out
what the state wanted the scope of its law to be.o3 That is why Currie
resorted to the selfish-state assumption and made little progress
thereafter. But it turns out that states do say what they want the scope
of their laws to be. They say so through their choice-of-law rules.
Where does this leave us? It implies a fairly substantial revision to
current choice-of-law practice. Under current practice, in defiance of
Currie's insight, states regularly assert the authority to determine the
scope of other states' laws. I have argued elsewhere that this is clearly
wrong, in fact unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause."o0 Here I argue that it is also something that Currie's teachings should lead states to stop doing.
Will they in practice? Probably not, unless the Supreme Court makes
them, which it probably will not. But sometimes ideas do win on their
merits; they do affect judicial practice. Choice of law is actually the area
in which this seems to have happened the most. And though many
people believe that the influence of academics is the reason that the field

103. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis, supra note 56; Brilmayer, Methods and
Objectives, supra note 57.
104. See Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 1874 & n.186; see also U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
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is viewed as a disaster, I am a bit more optimistic. If states do follow
Currie's insight, things will get simpler and easier.
All states will agree on scope, because they have to. This is Currie's
insight, although he did not quite see this consequence of it. Each state
has the power to set the scope of its own law and to bind other states on
that question. States may not agree on priority. This is also Currie's
insight. No state has the power to bind any other on the question of
which law should get priority in a conflict. I think they will agree a fair
amount-I think that if they understand the structure of choice-of-law
analysis, they will agree much more than they currently do-but
perhaps not all the time. Stronger constitutional limits, a topic I've
explored in other articles, might make them agree more-if we limited
permissible rules of priority, then we might find that states agreed more
on which laws should prevail in a conflict. 0 ' However, there will
probably be some persistent disuniformity.
That is not a cause for despair, however. That is just the price of
federalism. States differ as to their substantive visions of the good, and
they may also differ as to their visions of the best approach to resolving
conflicts among their laws. If the conflicts prove too intractable, the
federal government offers a way out-Congress can give us substantive
uniformity and preempt state laws, which it does frequently, or it could
resolve particular choice-of-law problems via Full Faith and Credit
legislation, which it does much less but should do more often. Or, most
ambitious, it could even prescribe a national set of rules of priority
resolving all choice-of-law problems. That would be the promised land
as far as choice of law is concerned, but it's a topic for another day. My
claim here is only that Currie takes us farther than most people
recognize. Not all the way to the promised land of uniformity, but close
enough to get a glimpse at it. Currie, we could say, took us to the top
of the mountain. Getting down is up to us.

105. See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 2503-34. For other analysis of constitutional
constraints, see generally Laycock, supra note 35; Gary J. Simson, State Autonomy in
Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61 (1978).

